FREE CHAPTER from ‘A Practical Guide to Summary Cause Procedure in the Sheriff Courts in Scotland’ by Andrew Stevenson

13/10/2026

CHAPTER ONE – THE SOURCES, TYPES AND SCOPE OF SUMMARY CAUSE PROCEDURE

The procedure is to be found in various repositories. These are as follows;

The primary legislation which is the foundation of the modern summary cause is Section 35 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971. It specifically abolished the definition of summary cause contained in the 1907 Act and replaced it with a new one. In 1971 the privative jurisdiction limit was £250. This original figure was increased over the years and in 2007, by Act of Sederunt, it was raised to £5000, where it remains.

Section 32 of the 1971 Act once allowed the Court of Session to regulate procedure in the sheriff court, including summary causes. Section 104 of the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 is the equivalent current provision. So, for example, Act of Sederunt 2015 (No.227) which amended the Summary Cause Rules in relation to personal injuries and remits was made under Section 104.

Section 36 of the 1971 Act states that as regards procedure “A summary cause shall be commenced by a summons in, or as nearly as is practicable in, such form as may be prescribed by rules under the said section 32.” (even although Section 32 is repealed) and that “The evidence, if any, given in a summary cause shall not be recorded.

Chapter 1 of the Summary Cause Rules 2002 refers to half a dozen statutes which are referred to in those Rules. These are the 1907 and 1971 Acts, the Litigants in Person (Costs and Expenses) Act 1975, the Vulnerable Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2004, the Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980 and the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990.

Acts which are mentioned in the 2002 Rules but not in Chapter 1 are (in relation to actions raised after 2015) the Equality Act 2010, the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972, Administration of Justice Act 1982, Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act 1991, Bankruptcy and Diligence etc. (Scotland)Act 2007 Child Support Act 1991, Children (Scotland) Act 1995, Citation Amendment (Scotland) Act 1882, Civil Evidence (Scotland) Act 1988, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) Act 2018, Consumer Credit Act 1974, Damages (Scotland) Act 2011, Debt Arrangement and Attachment (Scotland) Act 2002, Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987, European Communities Act 1972, Sheriff Court Consignations (Scotland) Act 1893, Sheriff Courts (Civil Jurisdiction and Procedure) (Scotland) Act 1963, “the Small Debt Acts” including the Small Debt (Scotland) Acts 1837 to 1889, Titles to Land Consolidation (Scotland) Act 1868 and the Trustee Investments Act 1961.

The chief secondary legislation is of course the Act of Sederunt (Summary Cause Rules) 2002 – Scottish Statutory Instrument No.132 of 2002. Its preamble states that this measure is enacted by the Court of Session under Section 32 of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 and that it came into force on 10th June 2002. Paragraph 2 of the Act of Sederunt states that Schedule 1 has “effect for the purpose of providing rules for a summary cause other than a small claim.” Schedule 1 consists of two components. Firstly. there is a set of chapters, originally 35 in number, which are sub-divided into a total of around 150 rules. Secondly, there is an Appendix which consists of Forms (original 69 in number) and a Glossary of Terms. Other secondary legislation is;

  • Act of Sederunt (Intimation and Service) 2025. (S.S.I. 2025/301)
  • Act of Sederunt (Electronic Signature and Electronic Transmission of Documents) 2025 (S.S.I. 2025/302)

Sheriffs Principal Guidance

In essence these are the same as Practice Notes. In addition, since they are issued by all the Sheriffs principal collectively, they apply across the whole of Scotland. Those to which regard must be had are;

Management of Summary Cause Proceedings, Housing (Scotland) Act 2001, 1st July 2022

Guidance for Court Users; Electronic Submission of Documents, 14 October 2022

Guidance for Court Users; Proceedings in the Sheriff Court, 26th October 2023

There are twelve types of summary cause, as follows;

  1. Actions by social landlords (local authorities and registered social landlords (R.S.L.) such as housing associations) for repossession of heritable property. In terms of callings these are by far the most common type of summary cause. Macphail (3rd ed 2006 para 31.02n) opines that with one exception relative to the Land Tenure Reform (Scotland) Act 1974, Section 9 all actions for removing from heritable property must be brought as summary causes unless there is an alternate or additional crave for £1500 (the limit at that time). There is now the Housing (Scotland) Act 2014, which transfers to the First Tier Tribunal (Property and Housing Chamber) the court’s jurisdiction in relation to private domestic tenancies.
  2. Actions by social landlords for termination of a joint tenant’s interest in a tenancy. This is a new remedy, created by the Domestic Abuse (Protection)(Scotland) Act 2021 which by Section 22 will amend Section 14 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001. It is anticipated that this will come into force on 1st August 2026. The Domestic Abuse (Protection) (Scotland) Act 2021 (Consequential and Supplementary Amendments) Regulations 2026 S.S.I. 2026 No 133. Amends the Sheriff Court (Scotland) Act 1971 by adding at Section 35(1) – i.e. the definition of summary cause – “(e). proceedings under Section 14(1)(b) of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 for termination of a tenant’s interest in a tenancy” other than where there is an additional or alternative crave for more than £5000.
  3. Actions of summary removal/ejection by any landowner of unauthorised occupiers of heritable property. This wide category covers domestic property where there has never been a lease, squatters and where the lease of non-domestic property has terminated.
  4. Actions for delivery of moveable property where there is no alternative crave for payment. If there is such a crave and it is for £5000 or less the action has to be raised under simple procedure. If it exceeds £5000 the action must be raised under ordinary procedure. If there is no such alternative crave at all it is incompetent to bring the action under simple procedure; Black Horse Ltd v Cameron [2019] SC DUM 36, or as an ordinary cause. This applies also to other actions ad factum praestandum. Form 7 is the designated Form of crave in such a summons and the Extract decree is in Form 28f – for delivery only. The Rules also contain Form 28g as a decree for payment where “the defender has failed to make delivery in accordance with the decree granted”, but this must be a relic from when it was competent to seek payment as an alternative to delivery under summary cause procedure.
  5. Actions ad factum praestandum (other than for delivery of moveable property) where there is no alternative crave. If there is such a crave and it is £5000 or under the action must be raised under simple procedure. If it exceeds £5000 the action must be raised under ordinary procedure. Form 8 is the Form of crave in a summons for implement of an obligation and the extract decree is in Form 28i. There is no equivalent of Form 28g.
  6. Actions of multiplepoinding where there is no alternative crave for payment over £5000. Such actions are governed by Chapter 27, and Form 5 is the appropriate form of crave. There are also Forms 5a (Statement by holder of fund or object when not the pursuer) and Form 5b as a Claim on the fund or subject.
  7. Actions of count, reckoning and payment for £5000 or under. These are regulated by Chapter 29 and the designated form of crave is Form 9
  8. Personal injury claims where the principal action craves £5000 or less. Chapter 34 governs such actions and the appropriate form of crave is Form 2. Form 10 is a statement of claim. There are also Forms 10a for a response, 10b Specification of Documents, 10c deemed grant thereof, 10d timetable, 10e statement of valuation of claim, 10f minute of pre-proof conference, 10g intimation to connected persons, 10h application for provisional damages, and 10i notice of application for further damages, 10j notice thereof. The forms are differently lettered for pre-September 2012 actions.
  9. Actions for aliment, subject to value (see later). These are regulated by Chapter 32 and the form of decree is Form 28h. Forms 36 and 37 are used for notice of intimation to children and next of kin where the defender’s address is unknown or where he suffers from a mental illness) These small value actions of aliment “may be brought before the sheriff as a summary cause” whereas the categories in Section 35 “shall be”. So, there is a choice of forum for such aliment cases; Macphail (3rd edition) 31.06.
  10. Actions of furthcoming where there is no alternative crave for payment over £5000. These are governed by Chapter 28, and the form of decree is Form 28e There is a requirement under Section 73J of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 upon the arrestee to make payment of a sum to the creditor within 14 weeks (not days) so this type of claim will be appropriate only if that does not happen.
  11. Applications under the Tenancy of Shops (Scotland) Act 1949. In its Report dated 8th February 2025 the Scottish Law Commission recommended that this Act be repealed, with no statutory replacement. That has not yet happened.
  12. Actions seeking payment of no more than £5000 in respect of damages for defamation. Since 2016 this is the only kind of action which resembles pre-2016 standard payment actions.

The original 2002 Summary Cause Rules also included provision for actions of sequestration for rent (a remedy abolished by Section 208 of the Bankruptcy and Diligence (Scotland) Act 2007)

Scope of Summary Cause Procedure

The history of summary cause procedure has been one of encroachment by other fora, and whilst it is not necessary to know when or how types of action ceased to be competent in the summary cause court it is necessary to know whether, in 2026, it is competent to try to raise an action there or whether it needs to be raised elsewhere. Four encroaching fora have been the Child Maintenance Service, Simple Procedure, the First Tier Tribunal and the All-Scotland Personal Injury Court.

Until 2016 there were three tiers of standard payment action in the sheriff court, namely small claims, summary cause and ordinary.

Simple procedure was activated in 2016 by the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 (Commencement No 7, Transitional and Savings Provisions) Order 2016. However, whilst it supplanted the Small Claims roll completely, a large part of summary cause procedure was left intact. Rule 1 of that Order applies the procedure only to that which is described as a “relevant claim”, which is defined in the Order as being a claim brought after 28th November 2016 which (a) would be a small claim but for the repeal of those provisions of the Sheriff Courts (Scotland) Act 1971 which created small claims procedure, and (b) on the assumption that the upper value limit is £5000 rather than £3000 (which was the upper limit of small claims in 2016).

Under the 1971 Act there was secondary legislation, the Small Claims (Scotland) Order 1988, in which the definition of a small claim excluded actions of “aliment and interim aliment and defamation”. Then, the Small Claims (Scotland) Amendment Order 2007 amended the 1988 Order so as to add “and actions for personal injury”, which removed personal injury from small claims procedure in 2008.

In other words, because by 2016 it was incompetent to raise a small claim action for aliment, defamation or personal injury it is equally incompetent to raise any of those actions under simple procedure. These types of action have to be raised under summary cause procedure, just as before 2016. True, section 74 of the 2014 Act permits aliment actions to be brought under simple procedure. However, that section is omitted from the Schedule to the 2016 Commencement Order and it has never been brought into force.

In 2026 it was intended, and it probably still is, that Simple Procedure Special Claims Rules would be brought into force to cover actions of multiplepoinding, furthcoming and count, reckoning and payment. Instead, such actions still have to be brought under the Summary Cause Rules 2002 Chapters 27, 28 and 29 respectively.

Incidentally, summary sheriffs are creatures of the same statute which set up simple procedure. Section 5 of the 2014 Act established summary sheriffs, whose “civil competence and jurisdiction” is defined by Section 44 and Schedule 1. The schedule includes simple procedure, family proceedings and it refers to diligence but it does not mention summary causes. Applying the principle inclusio unius, exclusio alterius it is questionable that summary sheriffs are authorised to undertake the vast majority of summary causes. Orders made by them in, for instance, heritable cases may be ultra vires.

The explanatory notes to the Tribunals (Scotland) Act 2014 states that it “creates a new structure for tribunals dealing with devolved matters under the judicial leadership of the Lord President of the Court of Session as head of the Scottish Tribunals.” Within this structure sits the First Tier Tribunal for Scotland (Housing and Property Chamber). Section 13 of the Act states that each of the First Tier Tribunals “is to consist of its ordinary, legal and judicial members”. Sheriffs (but not part-time sheriffs) may sit as tribunal members. Appeals lie to the Upper Tribunal. We now have sheriffs determining, within the Tribunal system, disputes about private residential tenancies that would have been heard by sheriffs in court prior to the 2014 Act.

The reason why this body is covered by a book on summary cause procedure in the sheriff court is because it now deals with a large portion of the business which made up the workload of the summary cause court until around ten years ago. It appears to take longer and be less predictable than the sheriff court. In diminishing the jurisdiction of the summary cause court by far the most significant statutory provisions are Sections 16 to 19 of and Schedule 1 (Transfer of Jurisdiction to First-Tier Tribunal) to the Housing (Scotland) Act 2014. These affect private tenancies created under the Rent (Scotland) Act 1984 and the Housing (Scotland) Act 1988. Section 16 provides that;

  1. The functions and jurisdiction of the sheriff in relation to actions arising from the following tenancies and occupancy agreements are transferred to the First-tier Tribunal—
    1. a regulated tenancy (b) a Part VII contract (c) an assured tenancy

Confirming this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the sheriff court, the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016, which created the current form of private domestic lease, namely the “private residential tenancy” provides at Section 71 that;

  1. In relation to civil proceedings arising from a private residential tenancy—
    1. the First-tier Tribunal has whatever competence and jurisdiction a sheriff would have but for paragraph (b),
    2. a sheriff does not have competence or jurisdiction.

The effect of Section 16 of the 2014 Act and Section 71 of the 2016 Act is that any action arising from a private tenancy is within the exclusive remit of the First Tier Tribunal. So this does not simply mean actions for repossession of the house. It includes an action for payment of rent, or for compensation for damage caused to the house. Because jurisdiction is determined by subject matter, not by value, it also includes actions which are of the simple procedure or ordinary cause level.

The question of whether a dispute “arises from” a private residential tenancy was considered in Your Home Partners v Kellichan and Hood [2026] SC KDY 34, by the Upper Tribunal in Anderson v Stark [2019] UT 48, where the now Sheriff Principal Ross found that “… the natural and ordinary effect of the words ‘arising from’ is unrestricted and imprecise, and invites a wide, inclusive approach”. Parker v Inkersall Investments Ltd [2018] SC DUM 66, was dismissed because it was brought in the wrong forum, namely in the sheriff court rather than the Tribunal.

One has to question why the Tribunal has been given jurisdiction to deal with payment actions which happen to be connected with only private tenancies. The Tribunal routinely awards summary cause level sums. In Mackellar v Carlin (15th October 2025), Scott v Ahmed (23rd October 2025) and Arnloss Management Co Ltd v McKenzie (8th May 2026) the landlord sought decree for payment of rent arrears under a private residential tenancy. In the former two the sums sought were £4154 and £4682.31 respectively, squarely within the summary cause upper limit of £5000. Despite the fact that the cases were undefended both called at case management hearings and written judgments were issued for these sums. This hardly seems like a good use of resources. In the last case the sum sued for was £6600 but the arrears had diminished to £3300 by the time that decree was granted.

McCallum v Hayter-Hames (24 April 2026) was a First Tier Tribunal case which had all the characteristics of an ordinary action other than that it arose from a private tenancy where the tenant claimed that he had not been warned about lead in drinking water, and sued for £12,000. Negligence was not established and the claim was dismissed.

By contrast, under the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001 Section 14, the landlord under a Scottish secure tenancy must raise proceedings by way of summary cause for recovery of possession of the house.

Another forum which may encroach is the All-Scotland Personal Injury Court. Bowers v Aviva Insurance Ltd [2026] SAC (Civ) 7 was a very low action in that court. It could competently be raised there because for the purposes of the All-Scotland Sheriff Court (Personal Injury Court) Order 2015 No 213 it was a workplace related claim exceeding £1000. So it was permissible but not obligatory to raise it there, making it an ordinary action. It could equally have been raised as a summary cause. The claim was valued by the pursuer at £3923.48 and it settled for £3750 plus expenses. The sheriff awarded those expenses on the summary cause scale. The pursuer appealed. However, Sheriff Principal Ross held that “the sheriff was justified in identifying that the case was of minor value compared to the exposure of the defender in expenses, and there had been no good reason to choose ASPIC (and therefore ordinary cause procedure) over raising summary cause proceedings.”

One of the hazards facing solicitors is that they could raise an action in the wrong forum.

This could happen in a number of ways;

  1. The subject matter of the action is not capable of being litigated in the sheriff court at all (see above regarding tenancies).
  2. The court lacks territorial jurisdiction (which can of course happen at any level in the sheriff court).
  3. The action seeks a payment remedy the sum craved of which is incompetent. Broadly speaking, a claim worth over £5000 must be in the ordinary court. A claim worth £5000 or less must be in either the summary cause court or pursued under simple procedure. The upper limit for summary causes was raised from £1500 to £5000 for proceedings commenced on or after 14th January 2008. That figure is now far too low. It would be about £8500 due to inflation, and should be rounded up to £10,000.
  4. A composite action is raised and technical issues arise. A composite action is one in which there is a variety of different remedies sought. (see below). The principle is recognised that it is desirable to have as few actions as possible in order to address the consequences of one event such as an accident or a breach of contract. On the other hand, it is preferable to confine litigation to the cheapest forum possible. These factors can prove hard to reconcile, creating difficulties whatever the outcome.
  5. The action seeks a competent remedy of the wrong but nevertheless competent monetary value (e.g. the victim of an industrial injury sues for £5000 in damages but the court determines that the true damages would be £10,000).

In practical terms, a) and b) and c) are nowhere near as serious as d) or e) If one sends to the sheriff clerk a summary cause summons seeking damages for breach of an assured tenancy the clerk will simply return it on the basis of its being incompetent. The clerk at Glasgow will reject an action for summary ejection of the occupants of a travellers’ encampment in Rouken Glen Park and advise that it be raised at Paisley. If the clerk is sent a summary cause summons seeking damages of £10,000 for defamation it will be returned on the ground that such an action would have to be raised as an ordinary action. Either way, these kinds of error are easily remediable by directing the claim elsewhere without the defender being troubled or even made aware of it.

The most practical way of proceeding with summary cause procedure is to ask oneself which type of civil remedy is appropriate to solving a client’s problem. The best textbook on this is still D.M. Walker classic from 1974, The Law of Civil Remedies in Scotland, still quoted frequently in the courts but unfortunately long out of print. The following are all examples (each of which arises in the context of an executry with an unhappy family dynamic) in which an action could properly be raised and where summary cause is the only correct method;

A widower, Edgar Radnor, dies and his daughter Stephanie is his executrix. Edgar’s son Ferdinand, a wastrel, refuses to move out of his late father’s house. Stephanie’s remedy is to raise an action of ejection, as a summary cause. Ferdinand is entitled to legal rights in the moveable estate of Edgar. However, Stephanie fails to respond to his enquiries as to when he is getting his money. Ferdinand estimates that his father’s moveable estate does not exceed about £20,000. So he and Stephanie have legal rights whereby they are each entitled to a half of one half of the estate. Ferdinand’s remedy is a summary cause action of count, reckoning and payment against Stephanie as executrix. Ferdinand claims that a Mauritius Blue 1d postage stamp (worth around £2500) found in Edgar’s bureau belongs to him and not his father. The only remedy open to Ferdinand and indeed to Stephanie is an action of multiplepoinding, again as a summary cause. Having been ejected from the house Ferdinand inadvertently leaves behind his own collection of Crimean War medals, worth £500. Stephanie fails to deliver it to him. His remedy is an action of delivery of the album. This is a species of action ad factum praestandum and it would be under Simple Procedure if he decided to include an alternative crave of payment of £500 (or any sum of £5000 or less). If he chose not to include any alternative crave the action would be a summary cause. Ferdinand, having indulged in an evening of over-refreshment, posts on social media an accusation that his sister Stephanie is a shameless thief and swindler. She could, if she felt so inclined, raise a summary cause action for £5000 in damages for defamation.

Composite actions

These are single actions which seek more than one remedy. These can be problematic because on the one hand the courts prefer all contentious issues arising from one contract or incident to be resolved in one action (Stevenson v Pontifex & Wood (1887) 15 R 125, in the context of delict) but, on the other hand, different remedies are sometimes competent in different fora. As Macphail puts it “None of the proposals for resolving these difficulties appears to be entirely satisfactory (4th edition, para 23.36). Composite actions have caused many a problem in the context of summary cause procedure. Take the situation where there is a declarator linked to an order for recovery of possession or a crave ad factum praestandum and where there are no alternative craves for money. The key is whether of not the declarator is necessary. If it is, the case must be brought as an ordinary action and if it is not it should not be craved and the action must be brought as a summary cause. In the case of Rutherford v Virtue 1993 SCLR 886. the pursuer sought declarator that in terms of a disposition the defender was bound to make up a roadway, and further craved a decree ad factum praestandum in respect of the obligation. There was no alternative financial crave. The Sheriff Principal (Nicholson) held that the action, which had been raised as an ordinary action in the Sheriff Court, was incompetent. The pursuer had argued that while it was accepted that in normal circumstances and in terms of section 35(1)(c) of the 1971 Act, an action ad factum praestandum unaccompanied by any financial conclusion for more than £1500 could only be raised in the sheriff court as an ordinary action. The defender’s argument was that the action was essentially one of ejection, and that the original crave for declarator was unnecessary to give effect to the crave for ejection. Sheriff Principal Nicholson held that the crave for declarator was not essential to the action, and therefore concluded that the action was simply one of specific implement and was accordingly incompetent. He noted that “There will, of course, be cases where such a crave is essential in order to establish some disputed right or title, but in my opinion it will not be enough, in order to permit a particular form of procedure, to formulate a crave for declarator when that is wholly unnecessary.”

This line of reasoning was followed by Sheriff Principal Risk in the case of Milmor Properties Ltd v W & T Investment Co Ltd 2000 SLT (Sh. Ct.) 2. where he observed that what was needed was to categorise actions rather than craves, and that craves added simply as a decoration should not be allowed to characterise the form of procedure taken in any particular case.

Creston Land and Estates plc v Brown, an Outer House decision of 1 February 2000, illustrates the problems that can arise. The pursuers were the heritable proprietors of 87 acres of ground. The defender obtained occupation of the subjects in anticipation of entering a lease thereafter. This lease never materialised, but the defender would not leave. The action was originally raised as an ordinary action in Glasgow Sheriff Court but was transferred to the Court of Session. The pursuers sought declarator that they had the right to enter into possession of the heritable subjects, and asked the court to grant warrant for summary ejection of the defender.

The defender submitted that the action was incompetent because “actions for the recovery of heritable or moveable property, other than actions in which there is claimed in addition, or as an alternative, a decree for payment of money exceeding £1500.” must be brought under summary cause procedure; Section 35(1) of the 1971 Act. The pursuer’s position was that a crave for declarator was necessary and justified. The court agreed, holding that “The pursuers can therefore in my view legitimately seek to have their rights in this matter determined by the Court by tabling their declaratory conclusion. Had there been no such conclusion, it may be that the pursuers would have been open to criticism for not establishing judicially the nature of their claim to eject the defender.” A superfluous crave for declarator also featured in Clydesdale Financial Services Ltd v Wojcik [2019] SC PER 29, an ordinary action where there were craves for payment of £2217.94, delivery of a vehicle but also declarator of entitlement to recover possession of the vehicle. The sheriff held that this last crave was unnecessary and that the case should have been raised under Simple Procedure. Distinguishing Borthwick v Bank of Scotland 1985 SLT (Sh Ct) 49 (of which more later), the sheriff would not remit but dismissed the cause.

Amzaleg and anor v Hastings Insurance Services Ltd [2023] SC HAM 39, Sheriff Speir, 19 October 2023, provides a good illustration of how composite action procedural problems can bedevil a personal injury case. The pursuers were sisters. In 2020 Rose’s car was being driven by her sister, who was involved in an accident with the defender’s insured. As a result, Rose’s car was damaged and her sister was injured.

Having regard to Stevenson (supra) both claims were incorporated in one ordinary action. Rose sought £4592.17 as repair and associated costs. Her sister sued for £7500 as solatium. At debate, the defender argued that the sister’s claim ought to have been brought as a personal injury claim under Chapter 36 of the ordinary rules and “If that claim were dismissed for want of form, the first pursuer’s claim would also require to be dismissed as being below the financial threshold for an ordinary action. Personal injury actions are subject to a special procedure which is both obligatory and exclusive The sister’s claim “failed to comply with requirements of chapter 36 and as such was incompetent and ought to be dismissed.” On such dismissal the first pursuer’s claim was also rendered incompetent and fell to be dismissed. It was for a sum less than £5,000. Pecuniary claims below that threshold required to brought under the simple procedure: Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, s72 (3) (a). There was no requirement that both claims required to be contained in the one action. The sisters faced a dilemma for the current pursuers standing the different nature of their claims and the threshold for simple procedure. Thus, the second pursuer’s claim was above that threshold and the first pursuer’s claim did not qualify as a “personal injuries action”. As there were clear benefits in terms of expense and certainty in both claims being determined in one litigation the only viable solution was for them to be brought together in an Ordinary action. (Stevenson, supra)

Alternatively, the pursuers submitted that they should be relieved from any defect in form by the application of the inherent power of the court to cure technical errors. Reference was made to Macphail, 4th edition, paragraph 13.53. This could be achieved by the action being remitted to the personal injury action roll and the requisite timetable being issued. The balance of prejudice favoured the pursuers rather than the defender. The sheriff held that the action had not been brought in the correct court and he acceded to this request for a remit.

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